Hare on utilitarianism and intuitive morality

Erkenntnis 39 (3):305 - 331 (1993)
InMoral Thinking R. M. Hare offers a very influential defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections. Hare's argument is roughly that utilitarianism conflicts with defensible moral intuitions only in unusual cases and that, in such cases, even defensible moral intuitions are unreliable. This paper reconstructs Hare's arguments and argues that they presuppose the success of his problematic proof of utilitarianism. Contrary to what many have thought, Hare's negative defense of utilitarianism against intuitive objections is not separable from his proof. In the second part of the paper I argue that Hare does not succeed in defending utilitarianism against the objection that it is too demanding. The final section of the paper sketches a substantially revised version of Hare's reply to intuitive objections. So revised, the argument is independent of Hare's proof and affords a plausible answer to the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128506
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Thoemmes Press.
Rule-Consequentialism.Brad Hooker - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):67-77.

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