Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control

Philosophical Studies 180 (3):957-977 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action.Joshua Shepherd & J. Adam Carter - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:556-583.
Knowledge without Truth.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):29-51.
Corrigendum: On the Impossibility of Any Future Metaphysics.[author unknown] - 1961 - Philosophical Studies 12 (3):48-48.
Two Conceptions of the Self.Adrian M. S. Piper - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (2):173-197.
On Sturgeon’s “The rational Mind”. [REVIEW]Juan Comesaña - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3205-3213.
Correction: Ordinary Language and Absolute Certainty.[author unknown] - 1950 - Philosophical Studies 1 (3):48-48.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-26

Downloads
82 (#205,499)

6 months
36 (#100,696)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Joshua Shepherd
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Separating Action and Knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Knowledge Norms and Conversation.J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - In Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation: First essays. Cham: Springer.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.

View all 53 references / Add more references