Utilitas 19 (2):243-258 (2007)

Authors
Robert F. Card
University of Rochester
Abstract
Rule-consequentialism is frequently regarded as problematic since it faces the following powerful dilemma: either rule-consequentialism collapses into act-consequentialism or rule-consequentialism is inconsistent. Recent defenders of this theory such as Brad Hooker provide a careful response to this objection. By explicating the nature and theoretical commitments of rule-consequentialism, I contend that these maneuvers are not successful by offering a new way of viewing the dilemma which retains its force even in light of these recent discussions. The central idea is that even the most well-developed contemporary form of the view is ensnared in the following dilemma: as an agent-neutral consequentialist theory, rule-consequentialism is either inconsistent or it is desperately unmotivated as a form of consequentialism since it is committed to a non-consequentialist form of ultimate moral value
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DOI 10.1017/s095382080700249x
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References found in this work BETA

Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique.Robert F. Card - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):149-172.
Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs.Robert F. Card - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.

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Citations of this work BETA

On the Incoherence Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism.Alex Rajczi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):857-876.

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