Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry?

Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339 (2012)
Abstract
Expressivist views of an area of discourse encourage us to ask not about the nature of the relevant kinds of values but rather about the nature of the relevant kind of evaluations. Their answer to the latter question typically claims some interesting disanalogy between those kinds of evaluations and descriptions of the world. It does so in hope of providing traction against naturalism-inspired ontological and epistemological worries threatening more ‘realist’ positions. This is a familiar position regarding ethical discourse; however, some authors have recently defended a similar view regarding epistemic discourse. Others have argued that epistemic expressivism faces special problems, not necessarily attaching to expressivism about other areas. Their arguments differ in interesting ways, but the common strategy is an attempt to show that the very sort of meta-epistemological theorizing needed to articulate and establish epistemic expressivism involves the epistemic expressivist in some sort of internal incoherence or self-defeat. That is, they think that articulating or defending the position requires implicit commitment to the negation of one of the positions core tenets. This paper responds to those arguments on behalf of epistemic expressivism, suggesting that they each misunderstand what is crucial to epistemic expressivism. By responding to these arguments, we hope to achieve more clarity about what epistemic expressivism is and why one might want to endorse it in a meta-epistemology
Keywords epistemic expressivism  meta-epistemology  epistemic irrealism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Moderate Epistemic Expressivism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Hybrid Expressivism and Epistemic Justification.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2349-2369.

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