Authors
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance
Keywords Epistemology  Knowledge-How  Epistemic Luck  Cognitive Achievement
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12094
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.
The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-01-16

Total views
863 ( #7,912 of 2,507,480 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #24,862 of 2,507,480 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes