Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal

Acta Analytica 26 (3):285-293 (2011)
Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal
Keywords Epistemic value  Truth  Value of truth  Omniscience  Epistemic normativity
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9
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References found in this work BETA
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
For the Love of Truth?Ernest Sosa - 2000 - In Linda Zagzebski & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62.
Pointless Truth.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.

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Citations of this work BETA
Openmindedness and Truth.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224.

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