Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):701-734 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how hold, contra Ryle, that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement. We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,998

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):799-816.
The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and varieties of epistemic luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.
Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.
The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock.
Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.
Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence.Wayne D. Riggs - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):627-639.
Safety and epistemic luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.
Externalism, Skepticism And Epistemic Luck.Živan Lazović - 2010 - Filozofija I Društvo 21 (3):89-102.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-11-17

Downloads
172 (#113,082)

6 months
33 (#102,974)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine
Joshua Shepherd
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Citations of this work

Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.
Skills as Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese & Beddor Bob - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):609-624.
Knowledge and mentality.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):359-382.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 90 references / Add more references