La Ética de Adam Smith: Conciliando Paradigmas, una Propuesta Olvidada

Trans/Form/Ação 39 (3):23-38 (2016)

Authors
María Alejandra Carrasco
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Abstract
RESUMEN: En su Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales Adam Smith propone una ética que concilia dos paradigmas habitualmente considerados como incompatibles: una ética de virtudes, con normas orientativas e ideales de excelencia, y una ética con reglas universales que se aplican en todos los casos sin excepción. Smith lo hace cambiando el punto de vista desde el que se realiza el juicio moral, a una perspectiva que llamaré "simpatético-imparcial", y que corresponde a "los sentimientos simpatéticos de un espectador imparcial y bien informado". Este novedoso punto de vista le permite introducir características modernas a la ética clásica de la virtud para dar una nueva justificación a las virtudes positivas, así como cambiar el modo de entender las "reglas o principios universales". De este modo, Smith construye una ética capaz de dar cuenta, dentro del mismo marco teórico, tanto de los ideales de excelencia propios de la virtud, como de los imperativos universales modernos. ABSTRACT: In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith reconciles two moral paradigms that are usually considered incompatible: an ethics of virtue, with general guidelines and ideals of excellence, and an ethics with universal rules, which must be applied to all cases without exceptions. Smith makes this possible by shifting the perspective from which moral judgments are assessed to what I call the 'sympathetic-impartial' perspective, which stands for "the sympathetic feelings of an impartial and well-informed spectator". From this new standpoint, Smith is able to introduce some modern features into classic virtue ethics and provide a different justification for positive virtues, as well as to change the way 'universal norms or principles' are understood. Accordingly, Smith's theory accounts simultaneously, and within the same theoretical framework, for both ancient-like virtues and their ideals of excellence and for modern-like universal imperatives.
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DOI 10.1590/S0101-31732016000300003
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
A Dictionary of Philosophy.Antony Flew (ed.) - 1999 - Gramercy Books.

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