In P. Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies, Vol.2. Atiner. pp. 181-194 (2009)

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption that every true proposition is knowable, reaches the strong conclusion that every true proposition is known; i.e. if there are unknown truths, there are unknowable truths. The paradox has been considered a problem for every theory assuming the Knowability Principle, according to which all truths are knowable and, in particular, for semantic anti-realist theories. A well known criticism to the Knowability Paradox is the so called restriction strategy. It bounds the scope of the universal quantification in (KP) to a set of formulas whose logical form avoids the paradoxical conclusion. Specifically, Tennant suggests to restrict the quantifier in (KP) to propositions whose knowledge is provably inconsistent. He calls them Anti-Cartesian propositions and distinguished them in three kinds. In this paper we will not be concerned with the soundness of the restriction proposal and the criticisms it has received. Rather, we are interested in analyzing the proposed distinction. We argue that Tennant’s distinction is problematic because it is not completely clear, it is not grounded on an adequate logical analysis, and it is incomplete. We suggest an alternative distinction, and we give some reasons for accepting it: it results logically grounded and more complete than Tennant’s one, inclusive of it and independent from non-epistemic notions
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.

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