Many Minds, No Persons

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70 (2002)
Abstract
Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a person. I take all of this to support the view that we (human persons) are identical with human animals
Keywords Cartesianism  Dualism  Metaphysics  Mind  Person
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI croatjphil20022124
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,195
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Persons, Animals, and Identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 2008 - Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
Self and Body: Sydney Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood.Robert Lane - 2009 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):pp. 1-26.
Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
Incarnational Anthropology.John Haldane - 1991 - In David Cockburn (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 191-211.
When Does a Person Begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
On Becoming a Person.John Barresi - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
The Constitution View of Persons.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

51 ( #101,785 of 2,163,974 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,017 of 2,163,974 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums