Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):55-70 (2002)
Four non-Cartesian conceptions of a person are considered. I argue tor one of these, a position called animalism. I reject the idea that a (human) person coincides with, but is numerically distinct from, a certain human animal. Coinciding physical beings would both be psychological subjects. I argue that such subjects could not engage in self-reference. Since self-reference (or the capacity tor self-reference) is a necessary condition for being a person, no physical subject coincident with another such subject can be a person. I take all of this to support the view that we (human persons) are identical with human animals
|Keywords||Cartesianism Dualism Metaphysics Mind Person|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Privileges of First-Person Reference and of Third-Person Reference.Guido Melchior - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):37-52.
Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW]Theodore Sider - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48.
Self and Body: Sydney Shoemaker.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood.Robert Lane - 2009 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):pp. 1-26.
Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
Incarnational Anthropology.John Haldane - 1991 - In David Cockburn (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 191-211.
The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #101,785 of 2,163,974 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,017 of 2,163,974 )
How can I increase my downloads?