Philosophy of Science 64 (4):303 (1997)

Authors
Nancy Cartwright
London School of Economics
Abstract
In this paper the claim that laws of nature are to be understood as claims about what necessarily or reliably happens is disputed. Laws can characterize what happens in a reliable way, but they do not do this easily. We do not have laws for everything occurring in the world, but only for those situations where what happens in nature is represented by a model: models are blueprints for nomological machines, which in turn give rise to laws. An example from economics shows, in particular, how we use--and how we need to use--models to get probabilistic laws.
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DOI 10.1086/392608
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References found in this work BETA

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.
Explaining Science.Ronald Giere - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):386-388.
Logic of Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1976 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Limits of Exact Science, From Economics to Physics.Nancy Cartwright - 1999 - Perspectives on Science 7 (3):318-336.

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Cartwright on Laws and Composition.David Spurrett - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):253 – 268.

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