New Boundary Lines

Abstract

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2017 - In Jeffrey Dunn Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.
Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Lorraine Code - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):829-831.
Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
Epistemic Rationality and Justification.Wei-Ming Wu - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-29

Downloads
136 (#94,071)

6 months
30 (#42,055)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alejandro Pérez Carballo
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: pp. 123-145.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.

View all 67 references / Add more references