AbstractIntellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational.
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Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.