Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267 (2020)
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| Abstract |
Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’.
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| Keywords | expressivism non-cognitivism negation problem |
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| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqz047 |
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References found in this work BETA
Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.
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