Non-Reductive Objectivism – A Dual-Aspect Model of Causality


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Abstract
Non-reductive objectivist accounts of color have been the focus of a certain amount of discussion recently. The present paper examines what explanations would be needed in order for an extended version of the viewpoint encompassing most of the sensory qualities to achieve conceptual consistency with the scientific account of reality. Once the explanations required have been identified, a form of non-reductive objectivism that meets them and embodies a dual-aspect model of causality is put forward. It is shown that this sheds new light on the hard problem of consciousness and supports a physicalist interpretation of man while also according reality in the external world to the phenomenal content of sensory experience
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References found in this work BETA

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
A Simple View of Colour.John Campbell - 1993 - In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.
Singling Out Properties.Stephen Yablo - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:477-502.
Principles of Human Knowledge ;.George Berkeley - 1996 - Oxford University Press.

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