On central cognition

Philosophical Studies 170 (1):143-162 (2014)
Abstract
This article examines what is known about the cognitive science of working memory, and brings the findings to bear in evaluating philosophical accounts of central cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning. It is argued that central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts. Contrary to a broad spectrum of philosophical opinion, the central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active.Introduction: philosophers’ commitmentsMost philosophers believe that our so-called “personal-level” propositional attitudes—our personal judgments, beliefs, goals, values, decisions, and intentions—are consciously accessible. Many will also allow, of course, that some of the processing that takes place within our perceptual faculties is inaccessible to us; and many will grant the possibility of unconscious attitudes, as well as processes of inference and decision mak
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0171-1
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Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.

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