Analysis 26 (6):189 - 192 (1966)
Thesis: Even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Hume) Antithesis: A man who knows of at least one case of an X being a Y, and who does not know of any positive reason for thinking that an X might not be a Y, has some reason for thinking that all X's are Y's (p. 81). When I speak of ‘some reason’ I mean the contradictory of no reason at all (p. 85). (‘A Possible Extension of Logical Theory?’ Geoffrey Hunter, Philosophical Studies 1965, pp. 81–8.)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Reasons for Action: Justification Vs. Explanation.James Lenman - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy.Diane Jeske - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
Motivation, Reconsideration and Exclusionary Reasons.Antony Hatzistavrou - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):318-342.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
A Wrong Turn to Reasons?Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads25 ( #201,003 of 2,158,842 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #193,365 of 2,158,842 )
How can I increase my downloads?