Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360 (2001)
Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs whose intrinsic value cannot be outweighed by any number of states of certain other, less valuable, kinds. Such``non-trade-off'' cannot reasonably be explained in terms of organic unities, and it can be reconciled with the additivity thesis only if we are prepared to give up some traditional claims about the nature of intrinsic value.
|Keywords||additivity basic value intrinsic value lexicality G. E. Moore organic unities|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.
Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653 - 666.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #103,182 of 2,158,795 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #193,668 of 2,158,795 )
How can I increase my downloads?