Pleasure as Genesis in Plato’s Philebus

Ancient Philosophy 31 (1):73-94 (2011)
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Socrates’ claim that pleasure is a γένεσις unifies the Philebus’ conception of pleasure. Close examination of the passage reveals an emphasis on metaphysical-normative dependency in γένεσις. Seeds for such an emphasis were sown in the dialogue’s earlier discussion of μεικτά, thus linking the γένεσις claim to Philebus’ description of pleasure as ἄπειρον. False pleasures illustrate the radical dependency of pleasure on outside determinants. I end tying together the Philebus’ three descriptions of pleasure: restoration, indefinite, and γένεσις.



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An Inconsistency in the Philebus?Joachim Aufderheide - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):817 - 837.
Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2020 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03009.

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