Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381 (2011)
Conciliatory views about disagreement with one’s epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often, when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement.
|Keywords||Disagreement Defeaters Higher-order evidence Epistemic peers Conciliatory views|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
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Citations of this work BETA
Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):368-387.
Conciliationism and Merely Possible Disagreement.Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2015 - Synthese 193 (9):1-13.
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