Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):135-157 (2006)

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Abstract
Three interlocking features appear to underpin Rawls’s justification of political compliance within the context of political liberalism: namely, a specific territory; a specific society; and a specific conception of what it is to be reasonable. When any one feature is subject to critical examination, while presupposing that the other two are acceptable, Rawls’s argument for political compliance may seem persuasive. But when all three features are critically examined together, his justification of political compliance within political liberalism can be seen to lack cogency. Thus, political compliance fails to be justified by a free-standing political liberalism. Key Words: philosophical anarchism • political duties • political liberalism • political obligation • Rawls.
Keywords Rawls   philosophical anarchism   political duties   political liberalism   political obligation
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DOI 10.1177/1740468106065489
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References found in this work BETA

Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical.John Rawls - 1985 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3):223-251.
The Law of Peoples.John Rawls - 1993 - Critical Inquiry 20 (1):36-68.
Justice as Fairness.John Rawls - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (2):164-194.
Justice as Fairness.John Rawls - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press.

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Coercive Redistribution and Public Agreement: Re‐Evaluating the Libertarian Challenge of Charity.Clare Chambers & Philip Parvin - 2010 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13 (1):93-114.

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