Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278 (2004)
This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any significant retreat from a thesis of massively modular mental organization
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind Modular Practical Reason Reasoning|
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References found in this work BETA
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (eds.) - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
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