Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155 (2016)

Authors
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.
Keywords epistemic luck  virtue epistemology  knowledge
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/papq.12040
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
No Safe Haven for the Virtuous.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):48-63.
Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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