Simulation and the first-person [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475 (2009)

Peter Carruthers
University of Maryland, College Park
This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman’s view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9357-y
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References found in this work BETA

A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.

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The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
Interpretive Sensory-Access Theory and Conscious Intentions.Uwe Peters - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):583–595.

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