Social Constraints On Moral Address

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):167-189 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from engaging in what Stephen Darwall calls “felicitous moral address” (Darwall 2006). We should think of some members of the moral community as having “second-class moral citizenship” in ways that parallel second-class political citizenship. The injustice of second-class moral citizenship can be understood by drawing an analogy with Miranda Fricker’s notion of “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007). Fricker’s account of how people can be undermined in their capacity as knowers can be extended to show how people can be undermined in their capacity as makers of moral claims, which can be called “claimant injustice”.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Social Equation: Freedom and its Limits.Charles M. Horvath - 1995 - Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (2):329-352.
The Social Equation: Freedom and its Limits.Charles M. Horvath - 1995 - Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (2):329-352.
Moral Rationalism and Moral Commitment.James Doyle - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
Moral rationalism and moral commitment.James Doyle - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):1-22.
Moral and nonmoral innate constraints.Kathryn Paxton George - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):189-202.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-12

Downloads
236 (#52,881)

6 months
74 (#14,456)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?