In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press (2005)
One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to be pain. This assumption, which I call the Cartesian assumption, can be seen everywhere from the standard arguments against physicalism—such as those advanced by Kripke, Nagel, and Levine—to current theorizing about consciousness. I here argue that this assumption is false and that it goes wrong in two ways. I further argue that the appeal of the Cartesian assumption is due to a commitment many still have to a poorly motivated and misguided Cartesian model of consciousness and its relation to mental states. As an alternative to this Cartesian concept of mind, I argue for a theory of consciousness which claims that the “phenomenal character” of a sensation or perception—the “what it’s like” to have that sensation—is determined by the content of a higher-order thought one has of that sensory state.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman - manuscript
Consciousness and the First Person.Itay Shani - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):57-91.
Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Color, Qualia, and Attention : A Non-Standard Interpretation.Austen Clark - 2010 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 203.
Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness.Paula Droege - 2003 - John Benjamins.
Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
Added to index2010-01-10
Total downloads66 ( #75,769 of 2,146,275 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #226,708 of 2,146,275 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.