The Fragmentation of Reasoning

This article evaluates the scientific credentials of a distinction that is frequently endorsed by scientists who study human reasoning, between so-called “System 1” and “System 2”. The paper argues that one aspect of what is generally intended by this distinction is real. In particular, there is a real distinction between intuitive and reflective cognitive processes. But this distinction fails to line up with many of the other properties attributed to System 1 and System 2. Accordingly, the paper argues that the latter distinction is not real, and should be abandoned.
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Pascal Engel (2012). Trust and the Doxastic Family. Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.

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