In R. Ciuni, H. Wansing & C. Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Berlin: Springer. pp. 47-58 (2014)
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Abstract |
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underlying logic. Specifically, we analyse a possibile translation of the paradox into a modified intuitionistic fragment of a logic for pragmatics inspired by Dalla Pozza and Garola in 1995. Our aim is to understand if KILP is a candidate for the logical revision of the paradox and to compare it with the standard intuitionistic solution to the paradox.
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References found in this work BETA
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Michael Dummett - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Implicit Epistemic Aspects of Constructive Logic.Göran Sundholm - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):191-212.
Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability.Peter Marton - 2006 - Synthese 151 (1):81-98.
Problems for a Generalization of a Verificationist Theory of Meaning.Dag Prawitz - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):87-92.
Citations of this work BETA
Abductive Inference Within a Pragmatic Framework.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
We Don’T Know We Don’T Know: Asserting Ignorance.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi, Ciro De Florio & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3565-3580.
A Multimodal Pragmatic Treatment of the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Davide Sergio - 2017 - In Gillman Payette & Rafal Urbaniak (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy. The Road Less Travelled. Berlin: Springer International Publishing AG. pp. 195-209.
Pragmatic Logics for Hypotheses and Evidence.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Ciro De Florio - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
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