The Knowability Paradox in the light of a Logic for Pragmatics

In R. Ciuni, H. Wansing & C. Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Berlin: Springer. pp. 47-58 (2014)
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The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underlying logic. Specifically, we analyse a possibile translation of the paradox into a modified intuitionistic fragment of a logic for pragmatics inspired by Dalla Pozza and Garola in 1995. Our aim is to understand if KILP is a candidate for the logical revision of the paradox and to compare it with the standard intuitionistic solution to the paradox.



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Author Profiles

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Daniele Chiffi
Politecnico di Milano

References found in this work

Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2003 - Columbia University Press.
Fitch's paradox of knowability.Michael Dummett - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Implicit epistemic aspects of constructive logic.Göran Sundholm - 1997 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):191-212.

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