The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: Wide, Radical, Fallible, Plausible

Philosophical Papers 35 (2):205-229 (2006)
Abstract
This article argues that, suitably modified, the method of reflective equilibrium is a plausible way of selecting moral principles. The appropriate conception of the method is wide and radical, admitting consideration of a full range of moral principles and arguments, and requiring the enquiring individual to consider others' views and undergo experiences that may offset any formative biases. The individual is not bound by his initial considered judgments, and may revise his view in any way whatsoever. It is appropriate to describe the method as a balance between coherentism and fallibilist foundationalism. With these points in mind, various criticisms, including the claims that considered judgments are not initially credible and are shaped by prejudice, and that the method itself fails to determine principle selection, are challenged.
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DOI 10.1080/05568640609485180
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References found in this work BETA
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 2007 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
How Moral Disagreement May Ground Principled Moral Compromise.Klemens Kappel - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.

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