The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge
Oxford University Press (2011)
Abstract
Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.Author's Profile
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BD438.5.C355 2011
ISBN(s)
9780199596195 0199596190 0199685142 9780191731549
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Citations of this work
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.
