The phenomenal concept strategy

Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):212-236 (2007)
Abstract
A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,696
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
339 ( #10,738 of 2,237,425 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #20,515 of 2,237,425 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature