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The Single-minded Pursuit of Consistency and its Weakness
Studia Logica 97 (1):81 - 100 (2011)
Abstract
I argue that a compulsive seeking for just one sense of consistency is hazardous to rationality, and that observing the subtle distinctions of reasonableness between individual and groups may suggest wider, structuralistic notions of consistency, even relevant to re-assessing Gödei's Second Incompleteness Theorem and to science as a wholeAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
On the philosophical motivations for the logics of formal consistency and inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Rodrigues Abilio - manuscript
On philosophical motivations for paraconsistency: an ontology-free interpretation of the logics of formal inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - manuscript
Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ω-Inconsistency.Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):171-188.
References found in this work
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Philosophy of mathematics: structure and ontology.Stewart Shapiro - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Gärdenfors - 1988 - Studia Logica 49 (3):421-424.
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