In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Synthese Library (2020)

Authors
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Virtue perspectivism is a bi-level epistemology according to which there are two grades of knowledge: animal and reflective. The exercise of reliable competences suffices to give us animal knowledge; but we can then use these same competences to gain a second-order assuring perspective, one through which we may appreciate those faculties as reliable and in doing so place our first-order knowledge in a competent second-order perspective. Virtue perspectivism has considerable theoretical power, especially when it comes to vindicating our external world knowledge against threats of scepticism and regress. Prominent critics, however, doubt whether the view ultimately hangs together without succumbing to vicious circularity. In this paper, I am going to focus on circularity-based criticisms of virtue perspectivism raised in various places by Barry Stroud, Baron Reed and Richard Fumerton, and I will argue that virtue perspectivism can ultimately withstand each of them.
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DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.

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