Theoria 77 (2):180-193 (2011)

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Davide Fassio
Zhejiang University
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability Paradox alone, there is no substantive philosophical motivation to type knowledge, except that of solving the paradox. Every attempt to independently justify the typing of knowledge is doomed to failure
Keywords epistemic paradoxes  type theory  Knowability Paradox
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01100.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
The Liar Paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
The Knowability Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
Referee Reports on Fitch's "Definition of Value".Alonzo Church - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 13--20.

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The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):201-221.

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