Theoria 77 (2):180-193 (2011)
AbstractThe Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability Paradox alone, there is no substantive philosophical motivation to type knowledge, except that of solving the paradox. Every attempt to independently justify the typing of knowledge is doomed to failure
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Citations of this work
The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria 29 (2):201-221.
References found in this work
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
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