Assertion and relative truth

Synthese 191 (6):1309-1325 (2014)

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Abstract
An account of assertion along truth-relativistic lines is offered. The main lines of relativism about truth are laid out and the problematic features that assertion acquires in the presence of relative truth are identified. These features are the possibility of coherently formulating norms of assertion and the possibility of grounding a rational practice of assertion upon relative truth. A solution to these problems is provided by formulating norms for making and assessing assertions that employ a suitably relativized truth predicate and a perspectival notion of correctness. Two potential objections to this proposal are addressed
Keywords Assessment sensitivity  Assertion  Truth norm  Evans’ problem   Taste predicates
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0329-6
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References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Faultless Disagreement.Max Kölbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Relative Truth.Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
The Many Uses of Predicates of Taste and the Challenge From Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):79-101.
A Second Opinion on Relative Truth.Ramiro Caso - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):65-88.

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