Aristotle and the problem of intentionality

Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2653509
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Mark Textor (2013). Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.

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