Conceivability and possibility
Ratio 17 (1):118-121 (1975)
The purpose of this article is to defend Hume's claim that whatever is conceivable is possible from a criticism by William Kneale. Kneale argues that although a mathematician can conceive of the falsehood of the Goldbach conjecture, he does not conclude that it is not necessarily true. The author suggests that by taking into account Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, a revised version of his claim can be offered which is not open to Kneale's criticism.
|Keywords||Conceivability, Metaphysics, Nature, Necessity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):273-295.
Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.
Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections.Peter Menzies - 1998 - In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: Csli Publications. pp. 255--277.
Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism.Peter Kail - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Introduction: Conceivability and Possibility.Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne - 2002 - In T. Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--70.
Conceivability, Possibility, and a Posteriori Necessity: On Chalmers' Argument for Dualism.Karol Polcyn - 2006 - Diametros 7 (March):37-55.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-06-22
Total downloads1 ( #872,499 of 2,158,669 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,589 of 2,158,669 )
How can I increase my downloads?