Philosophia 44 (2):435-446 (2016)

Authors
Eduardo Castro
Universidade da Beira Interior
Abstract
This paper is a reply to Benjamin Smart’s : 319–332, 2013) recent objections to David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction : 503–511, 1991). To solve the problem of induction, Armstrong contends that laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities, where laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation holding between first-order universals. Smart raises three objections against Armstrong’s pattern of inference. First, regularities can explain our observed regularities; that is, universally quantified conditionals are required for explanations. Second, if Humean’s pattern of inference is irrational, then Armstrong’s pattern of inference is also irrational. Third, universal regularities are the best explanation of our observed regularities. I defend Armstrong’s solution of induction, arguing against these three claims.
Keywords Armstrong  Explanation  Humeanism  Induction  Laws of Nature
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-016-9700-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Laws in Nature.Stephen Mumford - 2004 - Routledge.
The Inference to the Best Explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Induction and the Glue of the World.Harjit Bhogal - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):319-333.
Best Before Date Necessity: A Reply to Psillos.Eduardo Castro - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (1):163-169.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is the Humean Defeated by Induction?Benjamin T. H. Smart - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):319-332.
On Induction: Time-Limited Necessity Vs. Timeless Necessity.Eduardo Castro - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):67-82.
Laws, the Inference Problem, and Uninstantiated Universals.Bradley Rives - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):496-520.
Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation.Barry Ward - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):537 – 552.
The Problem of Retention.Matthew Tugby - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
Armstrong and van Fraassen on Probabilistic Laws of Nature.Duncan Maclean - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):1-13.
Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities?Tyler Hildebrand - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
Divine Lawmaker.John Foster - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
Laws of Nature as a Species of Regularities.J. J. C. Smart - 1993 - In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 152-169.
Can Primitive Laws Explain?Tyler Hildebrand - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-15.
Humean Laws and Explanation.Dan Marshall - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3145-3165.
Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities.Holly K. Andersen - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (2):325-331.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-03-09

Total views
49 ( #233,224 of 2,519,861 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,232 of 2,519,861 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes