Knowledge and modality

Synthese 172 (3):341 - 359 (2010)
Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that (K)  All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths. Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate two related questions. Are there compelling general supporting arguments for (K)? Are there decisive counterexamples to (K)? My investigation uncovers two intuitively plausible principles that are not open to decisive counterexamples but which enjoy no compelling independent support.
Keywords A priori knowledge  Modality  Kripke  Necessary truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9396-5
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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