Kant and reductionism

Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106 (1989)
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Keywords Metaphysics  Perception  Personal Identity  Reductionism  Kant  Parfit, D
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DOI revmetaph198943164
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Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80.
Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism".Quassim Cassam - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):111-127.
The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason.José Luis Bermúdez - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts.Kathy Behrendt - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.

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Personal Identity and Reductionism.Brian J. Garrett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June):361-373.
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