Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica (2014)

Authors
Eduardo Castro
Universidade da Beira Interior
Abstract
State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the grue predicate.
Keywords Bayesianism  Grue  Hume  Induction  Probability
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Hume.Barry Stroud - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (4):597-601.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
The Cement of the Universe.J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
What is a Law of Nature?David M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.

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