Erkenntnis:835-852 (2021)

Authors
Gustavo Castañon
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora
Abstract
‘Possibilist Explanation’ is a promising account of scientific explanation which avoids the familiar problems of “how-possibly explanations”. It explains an event by showing how-actually it was epistemically possible, instead of why it was epistemically necessary. Its explanandum is the epistemic possibility of an actual event previously considered epistemically impossible. To define PE, two new concepts are introduced: ‘permissive condition’ and ‘possibilist law’. A permissive condition for an event is something that does not entail the event itself, but a necessary condition for it. A ‘Possibilist Law’ is a kind of scientific law that predicts that in the absence of a necessary condition N, the event E is not possible. Both PE and PL are legitimate and neglected parts of scientific knowledge and are especially suitable for human sciences.
Keywords Possibilist Explanation  How-possibly Explanation  Scientific Explanation  Necessary Condition
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00134-1
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
The Child's Conception of Number.J. Piaget - 1953 - British Journal of Educational Studies 1 (2):183-184.
Confirmation and Explaining How Possible.Patrick Forber - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (1):32-40.

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