Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability

Analysis 39 (4):212--219 (1979)
Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.
Keywords Conceivability, Language, Possibility
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DOI 10.1093/analys/39.4.212
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