Sobre el carácter no empírico de los enunciados de confirmación

Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):135-153 (2006)

According to all traditional theories of confirmation, statements such as “E confirms H” (where H is a hypothesis and E is the evidence that supports H) are a priori. Peter Achinstein has recently challenged this orthodox position. He claims that at least some confirmation statements are empirical. In this paper I criticize this thesis. I first show that Achinstein´s arguments are either flawed or inconclusive. I then argue that there are strong reasons to conceive of all confirmation statements as a priori. I conclude that inductive logic, if possible, must be a priori knowledge
Keywords Confirmation statements  A priori knowledge  Empirical content  Inductive logic
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