Tomberlin, Frege, and guise theory: A note on the methodology of dia-philosophical comparisons

Synthese 61 (2):135 - 147 (1984)
Tomberlin's comparative claims about the superiority of the De Dicto-De Re Account over Guise Theory concerning referential opacity are abortively premature. Nevertheless, he may be right. Yet the order of the day is to develop the De Re-De Dicto Account to the hilt. Not until this is done can any useful dia-philosophical comparison of the two theories yield any fruit. My deep desire is, of course, for the sheer enjoyment of experiencing the world from the perspective of each of the two views, indeed, from the perspective of other views — e.g., Frege's Sense/Referent Theory — that can be developed to the same data-encompassing stage as Guise Theory
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485312
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Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.W. V. Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
On Philosophical Method.Eric Matthews & Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):89.

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