The Ineffectiveness of the Denial of Free Will

Philosophical Investigations 34 (4):367-380 (2011)
Free will, before being an object of beliefs or theories susceptible of verification, is the omnipresent supposition of our conscious life. This paper claims that this omnipresence, even though it is not enough to validate theoretically free will, entails two significant consequences. First, that free will is the essential presumption of our actions, without which they would become incomprehensible. Second, that all denial of this – a rational action in itself – presupposes that which is denied
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01451.x
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The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.van Inwagen Peter - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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