The Ineffectiveness of the Denial of Free Will

Philosophical Investigations 34 (4):367-380 (2011)
Free will, before being an object of beliefs or theories susceptible of verification, is the omnipresent supposition of our conscious life. This paper claims that this omnipresence, even though it is not enough to validate theoretically free will, entails two significant consequences. First, that free will is the essential presumption of our actions, without which they would become incomprehensible. Second, that all denial of this – a rational action in itself – presupposes that which is denied
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01451.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,453
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Kevin Timpe (2006). Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--21.
J. L. Schellenberg (2004). The Atheist's Free Will Offence. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 56 (1):1 - 15.
Johannes Giesinger (2010). Free Will and Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44 (4):515-528.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

69 ( #70,672 of 1,925,262 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #124,740 of 1,925,262 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.