The possibility of knowledge

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141 (2007)
Abstract
I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to a proper understanding of what knowledge is.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of
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Call number BD161.C3534 2007
ISBN(s) 9780199208319   019920831X  
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp055
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Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
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Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.

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