Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):623 - 659 (1975)

Abstract
The empiricist bent of philosophy of science and epistemology over the past four decades has recently been challenged, partly by arguments that exploit the uncertainty about what precisely the given is. It is claimed that this uncertainty stems from the fact that all observation is theory-laden; different "enities" [[sic]] are said to be observed as the theory constituting them is varied. Observations therefore do not test theories. So-called tests are really circular arguments, if they confirm the theory, or question-begging, if they disconfirm it. Such is roughly the line of argument advanced by the new philosophy of science.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph197528499
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