In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113 (2011)

Authors
Yuri Cath
La Trobe University
Abstract
In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view illustrates that even if the arguments given here succeed it might still be reasonable to hold that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation.
Keywords Knowledge How  Knowledge That  Intellectualism  Stanley and Williamson  Seemings  Gettier  justification  intentional action  belief
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.

View all 46 citations / Add more citations

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