Noûs 43 (1):137-156 (2009)

Authors
Yuri Cath
La Trobe University
Abstract
What follows for the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument if knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge-that? The obvious answer is that the ability hypothesis is false. For the ability hypothesis says that, when Mary sees red for the first time, Frank Jackson’s super-scientist gains only knowledge-how and not knowledge-that. In this paper I argue that this obvious answer is wrong: a version of the ability hypothesis might be true even if knowledge-how is a form of knowledge-that. To establish this conclusion I utilize Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s well-known account of knowledge-how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge” . I demonstrate that we can restate the core claims of the ability hypothesis – that Mary only gains new knowledge-how and not knowledge-that – within their account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that. I examine the implications of this result for both critics and proponents of the ability hypothesis
Keywords Ability Hypothesis  Knowledge Argument  Intellectualism  Knowledge How  Knowledge That
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01699.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.
Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.
Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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