Timeslice Prioritarianism, Prudence, and Weak Pareto

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Andrić and Herlitz (2022) object to Timeslice Prioritarianism on the basis that it violates two purportedly uncontroversial properties: prudence and Weak Pareto. We will claim that their objection does not undermine Timeslice Prioritarianism because the basis of their objection is just a straightforward implication of utilitarianism. To establish this argument, we will show that a timeslice view satisfies prudence and Weak Pareto if and only if it is utilitarianism.

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Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value.Vuko Andrić & Anders Herlitz - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):595-604.

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